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Alice in Chequers-Land: The 
Government’s latest “analysis” of EU 
exit 
By David Hearne and Professor Alex de Ruyter, Centre for Brexit 
Studies 
Today, the UK Government published its long-term economic analysis 
of EU exit (HM Government, 2018a). Billed as the long-awaited 
“impact assessments” of how the UK’s proposed exit will affect the 
regions and nations of the UK, it is hoped that the document and 
accompanying technical paper (HM Government, 2018b) will help rally 
the country behind the proposed Withdrawal Agreement and 
accompanying political declaration. 
The Government has been roundly criticised as the documents 
suggest that any variant of leaving the EU will leave the UK poorer 
(Elgot, 2018). However, in many regards this is unfair: the 
overwhelming majority of academic economic evidence has long 
suggested this to be true (see, e.g., Bailey & De Propris, 2017; Born, 
Müller, Schularick, & Sedláček, 2017; Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, 
& Reenen, 2016; Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, & Van Reenen, 2016; 
HM Treasury, 2016). As such, the argument that the Government is 
minimising these economic costs whilst carrying out the political 
imperative of leaving the EU (as per the 2016 referendum) is not 
unreasonable. 
Our critique of the analysis is rather more fundamental: it doesn’t 
actually analyse the consequences of the Withdrawal Agreement. 
Specifically, the analysis compares 4 scenarios: 
1. ‘No deal’ – a default to WTO status, leaving all EU agencies and 
facing similar tariff and non-tariff barriers to other members 
without a trade deal. 
2. A ‘normal’ Free Trade Agreement – this would entail an 
agreement similar to most FTAs, removing all tariffs and 
reducing non-tariff barriers. This might be similar to that agreed 
with Canada, for example. 
3. Remaining a member of the European Economic Area – this is 
most similar to Norway and is seen as not fulfilling the political 
desire to end the free movement of people. 
4. The Government’s Preferred arrangement. 
Crucially, however, the 4th of these is not based on the legally-binding 
Withdrawal Agreement, but rather uses “trade cost estimates based 
on policy assumptions set out in the Government’s July 2018 White 
Paper” (HM Government, 2018a, p. 17). As eagle-eyed readers may 
recall, this is not the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated but rather the 
Government’s original “Chequers” proposals. These go well beyond 
the scope of the negotiated agreement in important ways. 
REPORT THIS ADPRIVACY SETTINGS 
Firstly, the so-called “Chequers” plan assumes 
“continued frictionless access at the border to each other’s 
markets for goods.” (HM Government, 2018c). The Withdrawal 
Agreement is silent on this – apart from Northern Ireland, which would 
continue to follow EU legislation in relevant areas. Indeed, although 
the so-called ‘backstop’ does imply membership of a customs union 
with the EU, this is not sufficient to guarantee zero frictions at the 
border as the example of Turkey amply demonstrates (Merrick, 2017; 
Srivastava & Barker, 2017). 
In addition, the latest economic assessments imply that the UK would 
be able to simultaneously avoid any non-tariff barriers with the 
EU and diverge from EU regulations and sign “ambitious” new free 
trade agreements with third parties (as well as maintaining all the 
benefits of existing ones). It is impossible to see how this is likely to 
be possible with existing technologies and the EU has already ruled 
them out during negotiations, in addition to which they don’t respect 
the EU’s ‘red line’ over the indivisibility of the so-called “four 
freedoms”. 
The remainder of the assumptions are based, not upon the concrete 
legal framework set out in the Withdrawal Agreement but rather the 
Government’s aspirations for what a future relationship might look 
like. Quite frankly, although the technical analysis is very good, such 
assumptions mean that the assessment bears as much relation to 
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